Thesis (M.A.Sc.) -- University of Toronto, 1995.
|Series||Canadian theses = -- Thèses canadiennes|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||1 microfiche : negative. --|
Abstract: We present a formal language theory approach to improving the security aspects of protocol design and message-based interactions in complex composed systems. We argue that these aspects are responsible for a large share of modern computing systems' insecurity. We show how our approach leads to advances in input validation, security modeling, attack surface reduction, Cited by: We define a formal language whose symbols are security goals and mechanisms. This allows us to express every security architecture as a string. Designing a security architecture becomes the task of generating a word in the language. Analysing a security architecture becomes the task of parsing a string and determining if it belongs to the by: thorized by the system’s security policy. The presentation of suitable formal methods for the abstract speci-ﬁcation and development of secure systems is the aim of this thesis. Using such formal methods secure systems can be built and tech-niques, such as access control, can be incorporated in the implementa-tion. As the main contributions of the paper: 1) the language-based security, including variable binding, is formalized in theorem prover Coq; 2) a formal type checker is built to type check (capture safe data flows within) Android applications using computer; and 3) the soundness of the language-based security technique (type system) is mechanically Cited by: 2.
In this paper, we propose a formal logic approach to specify the system security policies and rules and their reasoning in response to queries of accessing the system resource. Especially we investigate and handle the situation where the security agent’s knowledge based on which the access decision is made is not complete. analysis of detailed models of secure systems. By explicitly modeling the computer system and the abilities of adversaries, formal methods can prove that the computer system is secure against all possible attacks (up to modeling assump-tions). This provides high assurance of system security, even against as-yet-unknown attacks. This paper presents initial results in a comparative study of formal and conventional techniques in the design of a secure system component: a trusted gateway. The operation of a trusted gateway is briefly introduced. The industrial context of its development is . Brookes T.M., Fitzgerald J.S., Larsen P.G. () Formal and informal specifications of a secure system component: Final results in a comparative study. In: Gaudel MC., Woodcock J. (eds) FME' Industrial Benefit and Advances in Formal Methods. FME Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol
Summary of the book: Formal Methods for Safe and Secure Computer Systems Dr. A. Leventi-Peetz1 Introduction The potential benefits which formal methods contribute to IT-security have been early identified by the BSI through several previous studies. The book continues and . No part of this book shall be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, . secure mechanisms that can be used as building blocks when designing secure systems. This approach is also used in a textbook in preparation by the first author (Fernandez, Gudes and Olivier, ). We have tried this approach in several offerings of these courses, including both academic and industrial institutions. A. System functions are layered, and none of the functions in a given layer can access data outside that layer. B. Auditing processes and their memory addresses cannot be accessed by user processes. C. Only security processes are allowed to write to ring zero memory. D. It .